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ABSTRACT 
There have been several calls from LIS researchers for practical or 
applied research not to ignore the epistemological assumptions 
underlying the systems and artifacts they design lest they 
showcase only the dominant theory at a given time. Others have 
also deplored the “epistemological promiscuity” or “eclecticism” 
of the field, its incessant borrowing of theories and models from 
elsewhere (interdisciplinarity) and the fact that the field has 
largely neglected the contributions that philosophy and 
epistemology could have made in its research. This problem raises 
that of the boundaries of LIS and is all the more troublesome 
because boundaries between epistemological theories are fuzzy. 
Indeed, some epistemological theories share the same basic 
assumptions or are historically derived from one another 
(rationalism and positivism, for instance). Gathering a wide array 
of acknowledged theorists in philosophy of science and 
epistemology, this panel aims to examine how research work in 
the LIS field can clearly articulate the epistemological 
assumptions underlying that research and under what constraints 
this can be achieved. The topic is of prime importance to 
Information studies as a whole and to ASIST as the scientific flag 
bearer of information scientists worldwide. 
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INTRODUCTION (FIDELIA IBEKWE-SANJUAN) 
Several authors in Knowledge organization (KO) and in 
Library and Information Science (LIS) have deplored the 
fact that both fields have been driven primarily by practical 
applications and professional practices (Bates 2005, 2007). 
Yet others have stressed the need for research in the field to 
be more theoretically motivated, lest it continue to be 
perceived not as a scientific field but rather as a set of 
techniques used to solve practical KO and IR problems 
(Hjørland 1998, 2010; Bates 2005, 2007; Buckland 2012; 
Furner 2010, Bawden & Robinson 2012). Hjørland (2010) 
has recalled the fact that "epistemology is at the basis of the 
question "what is the scientific method", that we are all 
influenced by epistemology whether we realize it or not and 
has therefore urged scholars and practitioners in KO and 
LIS to make explicit the epistemological assumptions 
underlying research they are carrying out in the field. 
Hjørland (2010) also pointed out that there is a "limited 
number of methods for acquiring scientific knowledge 
which correspond to basic epistemological views such as 
empiricism, rationalism, positivism, historicism or 
pragmatism. When we develop a scientific methodology, 
we automatically fall under one of these epistemological 
theories." Hence the necessity that practical or applied 
research in KO and LIS not ignore the epistemological 
assumptions underlying the systems and artifacts they 
design. For instance, KO scientists and professionals who 
design classification schemes in a given domain cannot 
ignore the competing theories in that domain, (e.g. in the 
field of Arts), otherwise, they run the risk of showcasing the 
dominant theory. Furner (2010) has also urged LIS scholars 
to incorporate philosophy into their curricula. 
 
It is necessary however to distinguish between 
epistemological views and methods they inspire (Hjørland 
1998: 163). A method is a protocol or way of carrying out a 
given piece of research to obtain knowledge, whereas an 
epistemological view is an account of how knowledge is 
acquired that can be advanced to justify the use of a 
method. As Dousa (2008: 242) noted with reference to KO, 
“this distinction is important, for it suggests that, on the 
analytic level, the use of any given method within a KO 
system can be dissociated from the epistemological position 
that provides its theoretical justification- that is to say, the 
methods used in constructing a KO system need not mirror, 
in all particulars, the specific epistemological commitments 
of its creator(s) and/or curator(s).” Likewise, Tennis (2008) 
has rightly observed that it is necessary to distinguish 
epistemological theories and the methods that they are 
invoked to justify because the latter may not necessarily 
embody precisely the same theoretical assumptions as the 
former and can even depart from them. On this view, a 
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researcher may subscribe to a given epistemological theory 
(or point of view), but, in the course of his or her research, 
employ different methods, some of which are based on 
epistemological assumptions that do not coincide with his 
or her own.  
In practice, LIS researchers have tended to take the best 
methods at hand, without bothering much about the 
underlying epistemological assumptions therein. 
 
On the other hand, it may not be possible for a researcher 
developing a method, a system or a professional service to 
assert "this is the epistemological family under which this 
line of research falls” or to claim "the epistemological 
assumptions underlying this research borrow solely from 
positivism or rationalism or empiricism or social-
constructivism or historicism or hermeneutics”, simply 
because the work may borrow from methods issuing from 
different epistemological theories at different stages of 
realization. This is all the more true as boundaries between 
epistemological theories are fuzzy because some of them 
share the same basic assumptions or because, as noted 
earlier, one historically derived from another (rationalism 
and positivism for instance).  
 
The oft-proclaimed interdisciplinary nature of LIS with its 
attendant borrowing of models and theories from 
disciplines is increasingly being seen as a weakness 
(Buckland 2012, Cronin 2012) and the disciplinary status of 
the field has always been questioned. It is therefore 
important that LIS researchers articulate more clearly how 
they validate the scientific knowledge they purport to 
produce. 
In answer to these calls, this panel moderated by Julian 
Warner, will illustrate the interplay between 
epistemological theories and methods developed in various 
areas of LIS research and engage the audience in trying to 
shed light on the following questions: 
i) Is epistemological purism possible in scientific research, 
i.e. is it possible for a given piece of research, especially 
empirical or applied, to derive its assumptions and methods 
from one and only one epistemological theory? 
ii) Is the fact that we often have recourse to several 
epistemological assumptions from different epistemological 
theories a result of the epistemological nature of the 
theories themselves? Do they exist in their “pure” form or 
are some of them intrinsically hybrid in nature? 
iii) From its very origins, information science has been 
involved with both technological and social problems 
leading to an epistemological duality. Can the different 
epistemological viewpoints underlying methods to these 
problems be reconciled/transcended?  
iv) What can be done to make this task easier? Can we 
incorporate some kind of epistemological torch/roadmap 
into our LIS curricula? 
 
CLARIFYING EPISTEMOLOGICAL ASSUMPTIONS 
(BIRGER HJØRLAND) 
This presentation will emphasize that although 
“epistemological purism” is not attainable, eclecticism, on 
the other hand, is not the way forward: Some 
epistemological ideals are simply in mutual conflict. It is 
important that researchers develop a clear theoretical 
understanding of the field, and because information science 
is about the selection, description, mediation of use of 
knowledge and knowledge sources, our field has a much 
more direct connection to theories of knowledge 
(=epistemologies) than most other fields have.  
A general lesson from pragmatism and critical theory is that 
knowledge is created by humans for some specific purposes 
and serves some interests better than others. Knowledge, 
documents, concepts, and theories are not neutral in their 
use, but should be examined in relation to their implications 
for the users they are meant to serve. 
TOWARDS THE CULTURAL AND THE SOCIAL (JENS 
ERIK MAI) 
At an ASIST meeting a few years ago, Jonathan Furner 
(2011) asked: “what ought information science to be like?”, 
the following year Michael Buckland (2012) asked: “what 
kind of science can information science be?”, and recently 
Birger Hjørland (2013) asked: “is library and information 
science (LIS) an academic discipline?”  These questions 
suggest that there is something uniquely troublesome about 
the state of information studies, which demands 
philosophical explorations of the nature of field.  The end 
point for these three scholars’ explorations of the field and 
their proposals for future directions of information research 
suggests an epistemological shift in information research; a 
shift that demands a re-orientation of the field towards the 
cultural and social – a shift from information as an abstract 
neutral notion as bits that can be managed, moved, sought, 
organized and used to a particularistic notion of information 
that means something to somebody, that impacts people’s 
lives, that is right or wrong, true or untrue, useful or not.  
Towards a humanistic information science (cf. Feinberg, et 
al., 2012). It could be argued that information studies 
should consider the notion of meaning to be crucial to 
understanding the nature of information studies and 
people’s interactions with information.  In this tradition, 
information is particularistic and tied to specific users and 
situations.  Information is about something for someone in 
some context.  In this understanding, information is like a 
semiotic sign – it is something that is used to facilitate the 
exchange and production of meaning. 
THE GAP BETWEEN THE SOCIAL AND THE 
TECHNICAL (LAI MA) 
Information science has largely been concerned with what 
and how we may be informed. The construction of 
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information infrastructures and the collection, storage, 
organization and retrieval of information are social 
activities, and inevitably involve technical and 
technological knowledge. The social and the technical 
issues in the construction of information and information 
infrastructures, however, have largely been in different 
areas of study in information science. The separation is 
likely because of the common methodological divide 
between the scientists/engineers and the humanists. A 
communicative-pragmatic framework is suggested for 
bridging the social and the technical by looking into the 
ontological characteristics of information and information-
related phenomena. It is also suggested that methods are not 
necessarily objectivistic or relativistic, but a consideration 
of their epistemological and methodological commitments 
is necessary for any study. 
EPISTEMOLOGICAL ASSUMPTIONS IN KO (JOE TENNIS) 
In the context of knowledge organization (KO), we 
construct our research paradigms around the design, study, 
and critique of knowledge organization systems and 
practices (Tennis, 2008).  We do our research so that we 
might improve the organization and representation present 
in information systems, either through a basic 
understanding of their nature, or in more 
applied recommendations of work with or construction of 
indexes, classifications, or ontologies. The 
historical, epistemic, and ontological commitments in KO 
have been that if we are right about how we view the 
domain, its conceptualizations, and its users, we can build 
the right knowledge organization system (KOS).  However, 
it seems that ”judgements of what is right” is contingent on 
a number of assertions, which require us, the researchers, to 
argue for one justified true belief or another.  Domain 
analysis is an example of a technique that works 
toward solving, what we call medium 
knowledge organization problems (Mai, 2010).  In domain 
analysis we are establishing what is the 
right conceptualization of the domain, 
its conceptualizations, and its users so that we might build 
and implement the right KOS.  Because we are seeking the 
right answer to the question: what does this domain 
contain? We must argue from an epistemically conservative 
position, namely a position where my statement of what this 
domain contains is knowledge, traditionally defined as 
justified true belief.  This requires us to align our 
epistemological and ontological assumptions with our 
particular method of inquiry so that we form a coherent, 
and what is seen as a defensible, argument for why we 
are right.  In this presentation, I will outline these 
assumptions, the questions that follow, and return to the 
question of justified true belief in the context of KO and 
KOS, with an appeal to intentionality as described 
by Buddhist philosophy (Harvey, 1995). 
 
TRANSCENDING EPISTEMOLOGICAL DUALITY 
(JULIAN WARNER) 
Information science has classically involved an 
epistemological duality, of scientific and mathematical 
methods and also of forms of understanding associated with 
the humanities and social sciences. The duality can be 
traced to the concern of information science with 
computational technologies and with human subjects.  As 
such, inclusion of both elements seems inescapable within 
information science. 
The division implied by the duality can still be transcended 
and an integrated viewpoint developed. The inescapability 
and value of the geometrical method for certain purposes 
can be acknowledged, while limiting its application to more 
directly human domains.  For such domains, a contrasting 
emphasis can be placed on restricting the length of 
inferential sequences and on empirical rooting and testing 
of propositions at each stage in their development.  An 
acknowledgment of the value of simplicity links both 
geometrical and human domains. A concrete example, for 
information science, will be given of the distribution of 
geometrical and more human modes of thought for 
information retrieval, with specificity obtainable from 
technological or machine transformations (a Google search) 
and combination or generic power reserved for human 
intervention and creativity.   
 
THE COST OF EPISTEMOLOGICAL PURISM (STEVE 
FULLER) 
‘Epistemologial purism’ is an ideal that has been perhaps 
most persuasively presented in Thomas Kuhn’s The 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions, in which a ‘paradigm’ is 
defined by a field of study that is unified in terms of a set of 
agreed theories and methods amongst field members. 
Epistemological purism enables peer review to run 
smoothly within the field as well as project a coherent 
image of the field’s domain and research trajectory to those 
outside it. These benefits are not to be taken lightly, 
especially in today’s neo-liberal academic environment, 
where it is increasingly important to be clear about exactly 
what you stand for, so that you are evaluated by the right 
standards (aka inserted into the right market). The cost of 
acquiring this state of unity is that your field will probably 
have to sustain some intense internal in-fighting about 
fundamental issues, the most likely outcome of which will 
be a purge of some members of the field (who may well set 
up their own paradigms, etc.).  
A good way for library and information science to think 
about whether purism is worth the cost is to distinguish 
between two sorts of internal fights that the quest for purity 
might require: (1) how to take forward a common heritage 
(e.g. ‘What is information (for)?’); (2) how to fill a 
generally recognised standing need (e.g. ‘How to improve 
information provision?’). If library and information science 
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professionals see themselves primarily in mode (2) – i.e. as 
epistemic service providers – then epistemological purism 
is probably not worth the cost of infighting. However, if 
people who see themselves in mode (1), yet at the same 
time project radically different futures for the field in light 
of contemporary challenges, then the fight is probably 
worth having, even if it means that certain field members 
will end up being purged – or excluded from the new 
paradigm that emerges on the other side of what will have 
been a ‘scientific revolution’. 
 
NOTE: 
This panel session is sponsored by the ASIS&T Special interest 
Group for History and Foundations of Information Science 
(SIG/HFIS) and reflects its concern with history and theoretical 
foundations of Information Science as a whole. It is expected to be 
of interest to all SIGs (AH, BIO, CR, DL, virt, H/FIS, ED, CRIT, 
IFP, III, and USE, MET, STI,...). As such, it does not fall tidily 
into any single themed track.  
The panel has two purposes: First, it offers a forum to articulate 
more clearly recent concerns on how the field is developing as a 
whole, on how builds its scientific knowledge and on what 
theories and models they are founded. A second goal of the panel 
is an attempt to engage ASIST membership and LIS researchers 
elsewhere in the constructive development of their field – in 
bringing to light the theoretical foundations of research they carry 
out with the hope that this will help to better recognize the fields 
achievements and contours (boundaries). 
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